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Abstract In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance 
approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one 
hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably 
the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on 
the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that 
constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally 
contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utte-
rance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact 
that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for 
in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction dis-
tinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, 
for things rather go the other way around.
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Introduction
In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance 
approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works 
on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on 
the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional 
and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional 
and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. More-
over, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextu-
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alist semantic terms. A fictional utterance of a sentence consists in that 
sentence paired with a narrow context of interpretation whose ‘world’ 
parameter is saturated by a fictional world, so as to yield for that sen-
tence certain fictional truth-conditions; a nonfictional utterance of a sen-
tence consists in that sentence paired with a narrow context of interpre-
tation whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by the actual world, so as to 
yield for that sentence certain real truth-conditions. Finally, I want to hold 
that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly 
fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains 
an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarep-
resentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction 
distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional 
works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.
1. Fictional Utterances Have Pride of Place
In the recent literature at the intersection between aesthetics and phi-
losophy of language and mind, a longstanding debate on the nature of 
fiction has being renewed: what does fiction consists in? Since a great 
amount of our fictional practices has to do with narrative items, a natu-
ral way of approaching this debate is by asking another question: how 
can we draw a principled distinction between fictional works and nonfic-
tional works? In this respect, one may think that answering the second 
question sheds light on the first question as well.
Clearly enough, however, matters are intricate. On the one hand, 
works that are prima facie ranked as fictional may contain a considerable 
amount of historical bits of narration (principally, but non exclusively, 
so-called historical novels). On the other hand, works that are prima facie 
ranked as nonfictional may contain some amount of fictional narration, 
or even at least of an inventive one (e.g. literary historical works, works 
of so-called new journalism). In this respect, even scientific works may 
exhibit this kind of feature. A scientific work may contain the description 
of a thought experiment. If one takes such an experiment as a practice 
in which one imagines that something is the case, then also a scientific 
work turns out to be imbued with fiction, or at least with made-up ele-
ments. One may then say that most works are a mixture of history and, 
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if not fiction, invention. Pace Deutsch (2000), invention is a broader cat-
egory than fiction, faction as some have labeled it.1 For it limits itself 
to capture freely narrated writings that may correspond to no real fact.2
Both textual and semantic criteria to draw a distinction between fic-
tional and nonfictional works have notoriously revealed not to be sat-
isfying. Nor seem other accounts, either speechact-theoretical or pre-
tense-theoretical ones, to fare any better.3 Prima facie at least: as regards 
those accounts, we will see in the next Section that matters have to be 
reconsidered. 
On the basis of the seeming failure of the above accounts, Stacie Friend 
has recently (2008, 2011, 2012) maintained that the quest for necessary 
and sufficient conditions in order for a work to be fictional is misplaced. 
In order for a work to be so classified, one must rather take it as belong-
ing to a certain genre. Following Walton (1970), she holds that such a 
belonging depends on whether the work has features falling under one 
of the following characteristics: standard (having such features tends the 
work to be ranked in that genre), contra-standard (having them tends 
to rule the work out of the genre), or variable (the fact that a work has 
such features has no bearing on its belonging to the genre in question). 
Friend’s way of putting things nicely copes with the intricacies I pointed 
out before. A fictional work that contains many historical bits of narra-
tive is just contra-standard for its genre, namely that of a fictional work. 
Conversely, the same holds as to a historical work, or even to a scientific 
one, which contain some fictional bits of narrative: they are contra-stan-
dard cases of the opposite genre.
Truly enough, this way of classifying a work is highly contextual.4 Tac-
itus’ narratives, which nowadays appear to be contra-standard examples 
of historical works because they contain several fictional elements, defi-
1 Cf. Geertz (1988:141).
2 Cf. Friend (2012:180), Davies (2012:68). In (2013), Deutsch restates his point, yet it 
still seems that his notion of invention covers more than the things that have to be prop-
erly labeled as fictional works.
3 For a review of these problems cf. e.g. Davies (2007), Sainsbury (2009).
4 Cf. on this Currie (2014:355), Kroon-Voltolini (2016). See also Friend herself 
(2011:177).
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nitely appeared to be standard examples of such works to the historian’s 
contemporaries. Yet in this respect contextual shifts may even be more 
problematic. As Friend herself acknowledges,5 it may well be the case 
that a work originally classified as fictional passes on being classified as 
historical (possibly as a contra-standard case) and vice versa. An example 
of the former kind may be the tale of the Troy’s siege The Iliad is based 
on, which after Schliemann’s archaeological discoveries may be used as 
a source of historical evidence. An example of the latter kind may be 
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia of Regum Britanniae, which is the first 
evidence of King Arthur’s myth originally taken to be true history. For 
some, the Bible is another more convincing example of this kind. Now, 
if being a fictional work is a matter of context sensitivity in this radical 
sense, even appealing to genres does not seem to be very rewarding in 
order to deal with the fiction/nonfiction divide.
To be sure, Friend would reply that this kind of context-dependence 
precisely qualifies how things work with genres. In Walton’s original 
example, Pablo Picasso’s Guernica is now a standard case of the genre 
of painting, yet it may later turn out to be a contra-standard case of guer-
nicas, where guernicas are the genre of works with “surfaces with the 
colors and shapes of Picasso’s Guernica, but the surfaces are molded 
to protrude from the wall like relief maps of different kinds of terrain” 
(1970:347). Thus, it may well be the case that what is now ranked as a 
fictional work may be later ranked as a historical work, and vice versa. 
This is precisely the case, says Friend, with Simon Winchester’s The Sur-
geon of Crowthorne: some of its features interest us if we classify it as 
fiction, some other of its features interest us if we classify it as nonfic-
tion (2012:198).
Yet in the Guernica’s case (or in The Surgeon of Crowthorne‘s case for 
that matter), what makes one change the genre attribution is the different 
similarity parameter with other things that is appealed to – if you like, a 
sort of Gestalt switch occurs in which different Gestalt properties of the 
work are grasped, as Walton says (1970:340). Its being violent, vital and 
disturbing makes Guernica be a case of paintings, while its being cold, 
5 See e.g. Friend (2008:164), (2012:198).
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lifeless and boring makes it a case of guernicas.6 But as to fictional vs. 
nonfictional works, the change in attribution may not depend on focus-
ing a different similarity parameter, but simply in regarding them dif-
ferently.7 Consider e.g. what I would label a lucid myth of creation, that 
is, a myth whose fictional and nonfictional elements were recognized 
respectively as such from its very beginning, yet it was taken as a histor-
ical work for a long while and as a fictional work afterwards. Some Maori 
myths may be examples of this kind (cf. Reed 2006). In conformity to 
Walton 1990:71, another such example may be William Prescott’s History 
of the Conquest of Peru, the inventive narration of the famous Spanish 
enterprise in that part of Latin America. Thus, if as to genres appealing 
to context switches allows this kind of subjectivity, it does not seem 
to be very helpful in order to understand whether a work is fictional or 
not: for a work, being fictional or nonfictional seems ultimately to lie in 
the eye of the beholder. Let me draw the following comparison with a 
Wittgensteinian idea of concepts. According to Wittgenstein (1953), one 
may rank something under a certain concept if that something shares a 
family resemblance with other thing falling under that concept. Yet if it 
is just contextually the case that it shares that resemblance with those 
things, for in another context it shares that very resemblance with things 
falling under an opposite concept, than that sharing is not particularly 
useful for classifying purposes. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds as to 
things belonging to a genre.8
6 Cf. Walton (1970:347).
7 As Deutsch (2013:370) puts it, “the same manuscript can go from not being fiction 
to being fiction in the blink of a publisher’s eye”.
8 Currie (2014:361n.32) suggests that the effect of relativity, or subjectivity, in the sig-
nificance that prompts a contextual switch in a genre attribution may be due to the kind of 
imagination that is involved: mere propositional imagining in the historical case, percep-
tual imagery in the fictional case. I am uncertain whether this suggestion goes in the right 
direction. Yet as Friend herself underlines (2008:155-6), historical narratives may well be 
mentally dramatized and still remain historical. In order to weaken this subjectivity effect, 
Friend seems instead to appeal to conventions: “because these conventions change over 
time, what matters to the decision to write fiction or nonfiction also changes” (2008:166). 
Yet I am not sure whether such an appeal to conventions is appropriate. If in order to jus-
tify the switch one has to look for something socially shared, rather than to conventions I 
would appeal to something as vague as Weltanschauung and Zeitgeist.
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Granted, in order to rule out those problematic cases, Friend finally 
appeals to authorial intentions.9 The ludic attitudes of contemporary 
readers notwithstanding, she would say, the Historia of Regum Britan-
niae is a historical work, for so Geoffrey wanted it to be read. Geoffrey 
didn’t want at all to tell a fictional story. By contrast, in reviving a certain 
tale, Homer (admittedly) wanted to tell a fictional story. Yet as is well 
known, intentions are tricky. Not only they may be missing – even if we 
put the question of Homer’s intentions aside, who knows what the Bible’s 
author(s) really wanted to write? – but they may be unsuccessful – while 
intending to write a pièce of fiction, for some unknown yet psychoana-
lyzable reasons an author may rather manage to tell an autobiography 
of a hidden period of her life10 – or even overridden11 – let us suppose 
that Homer wanted to tell true stories, yet his intentions notwithstand-
ing, his poems are masterpieces of fiction.12
2. Fictional Works Depend on Fictional Utterances
On the basis of what we have seen in the previous Section, it seems 
that the prospects of finding a way to tell what is fictional from what is 
nonfictional by starting from a distinction between fictional and nonfic-
tional works are rather dim. Yet in the literature there is at least another 
approach worth considering. Instead of starting from works and wonder-
ing which works are fictional and which are not such, one may start from 
utterances and speaking of fictional vs. nonfictional utterances originally 
9 See Friend herself (2008:165), (2011:177), (2012:193-4). On this intentionalist way 
of interpreting Friend’s position see also Deutsch (2013:369-70). From his own intention-
alist perspective, Currie would surely approve this move. Cf. (2014:357). 
10 For this problem cf. Sainsbury (2009:7).
11 As Friend herself acknowledges (2012:203).
12 As a matter of fact, Friend herself recognizes that in such a situation authorial inten-
tions are not the only relevant factor for classification, for also “the conventions associat-
ed with contemporary categorization practices” count (2012:195). Yet it is hardly the case 
that, as Friend herself acknowledges, appealing to either of the above factors is enough. 
In the end, Friend indeed admits that there may be cases of texts that would be better 
classified both as works of fiction and of nonfiction (2012:205). Yet it seems to me that in 
order for one and the same text to be so doubly classified, one has to resort either to the 
pragmatic or to the semantic accounts I will appeal in the next Section under the general 
labeling of the utterance approach.
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and of fictional vs. nonfictional works derivatively, such works being the 
result of sentences being uttered in one way or in the other one. 
In the literature, one has pursued this utterance approach in two ways, 
which have been already hinted at before, yet dismissed too quickly. 
Either one appeals to speech acts and says that what makes an utterance 
fictional is a certain kind of speech act, the fictive speech act if you like, 
which is performed in such an utterance. There are at least two ways 
of pursuing this appeal, either in intentional terms – the sui generis fic-
tive speech acts essentially is a matter of a certain fictive intent, to be 
cashed out in Gricean terms (Currie 1990)13 – or in normative terms – 
that speech act is basically a matter of complying with the appropriate 
norms that differ from the norms of assertion (Garcia-Carpintero 2013). 
Or one appeals to contexts of interpretation, the contexts providing 
for sentences their truthconditional interpretation,14 and says that what 
makes an utterance fictional is the fact that the sentence it utters is given 
a truthconditional content by interpreting it in accordance with a certain 
(narrow)15 context of interpretation, whose ‘world’ parameter is satu-
rated by a world of fiction (Recanati 2000, Voltolini 2006a). This appeal 
to contexts is a way of reformulating both Searle (1975) and Walton 
(1990) pretense or make-believe accounts of fiction. For in this perspec-
tive, both Searle’s idea that a fictional utterance is an utterance in which 
one typically modifies an assertion by pretending to assert something 
and Walton’s idea that a fictional utterance is an utterance of a sentence 
embedded in a make-believe game are reformulated as saying that a fic-
tional utterance is an utterance of a sentence interpreted in a fictional 
context whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by the relevant world of 
pretense or make-believe.16
13 Literally, Currie links the fictive intent with a text as a whole (1990:46). Yet it is clear 
that in his conception the fictive intent qualifies a text insofar as it preliminarily affects its 
sentences when uttered in a particular way.
14 For this notion, see Predelli (2005).
15 For this specification see the next Section.
16 Currie (2014:352) instead classifies Searle’s theory as a variant of the intentional-
ist account of the utterance approach. Clearly enough, unlike Walton’s account, Searle’s 
account is intentionalist, in that the pretense modification of a speech act is for him 
intentional. Nevertheless, I think that it is better to understand any pretense account in 
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For the time being, I do not want to discuss which of the two ways of 
developing the utterance approach is the best one. I will come back on 
this issue in the next Section. Rather, I want to stress some interesting 
consequences of this approach.
The first consequence is one I have already recalled. According to this 
approach, the existence of a fictional work is derivative upon the exis-
tence of a fictional utterance, or better a series of such utterances.17 In 
order for a fictional work to exist, one sentence (if the work is just a 
one-sentence one, a minimal work let us say), or better a series of such 
sentences (since works are normally based18 on more than one sentence), 
must be uttered fictionally. 
Secondly, a fictional utterance of one and the same sentence may be 
flanked by a nonfictional one. One may provide many examples of this 
situation. Consider a historical novel such as Alessandro Manzoni’s The 
Betrothed. As any Italian reader well knows, chapter I of that novel starts 
with the following sentence:
(1) That branch of the Lake of Como, which turns toward 
the south between two unbroken chains of mountains, pre-
senting to the eye a succession of bays and gulfs, formed 
by their jutting and retiring ridges, suddenly contracts it-
self between a headland to the right and an extended slop-
ing bank on the left, and assumes the flow and appearance 
of a river.
(1) may be uttered nonfictionally, as a part of a (true) description of a 
certain area of Lombardy, the richest region in Northern Italy. Yet it may 
also be uttered fictionally, with a view on the fictional story that Manzoni 
is going to tell, as set in the Lombardian environment providing the stage 
terms of context shift: a pretended assertion is a genuine assertion in a fictional context, 
a pretended order is a genuine order in a fictional context, and so on.
17 As various people have underlined: cf. Currie (1990), Davies (2007), Stock (2011). 
Davies (2015:43) labels it as the orthodox view of the scope of what a fictional work based 
on fictional utterances amounts to.
18 As we will see in the next Section, I take works as hybrid entities made both of utter-
ances – sentences in (narrow) contexts – and of their truth-conditional interpretation.
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for such a story. Likewise, if we take the title inaugurating chap. I of bk. 
IX of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia of Regum Britanniae:
(2) Arthur succeeds Uther his father in kingdom of  Britain, 
and besieges Colgrin
we may take it not only as a nonfictional utterance presenting an (actually 
false) description concerning some of the kings that ruled Britain after 
Christ’s incarnation, but also as a fictional utterance talking about at 
least an individual merely existing in a fictional world, i.e., King Arthur.
Finally, by taking those two consequences together, a third conse-
quence ensues. One and the same text, i.e., one and the same collection 
of the very same (syntactically individuated) sentences, may amount to 
two works, a fictional and a nonfictional one, depending on whether such 
sentences as a whole are uttered either fictionally or nonfictionally.19 This 
may well be the case of narratives that are both a form of historical tes-
timony and a form of literary invention, such as e.g. Primo Levi’s If This 
is a Man or Roberto Saviano’s Gomorrah.
In this respect, a defender of this approach does not have to concede 
that a work may be a patchwork made both of fictional and of nonfic-
tional utterances, as Currie (1990:48-9) instead accepts.20 As some peo-
ple remark, if this approach were forced to yield this ‘patchwork’ account, 
this would be a serious limit for it.21 Yet I think that one may legitimately 
reject such a concession,22 for three reasons at least. 
19 See also Walton (1990:71).
20 Searle (1975) basically takes the same line. Currie (2014) has further articulated his 
idea, by saying that the fictionality of works comes in degrees and that the degree of fic-
tionality of a work as whole supervenes on its intentional profile.
21 Cf. Stock (2011), Friend (2008, 2011). Yet Friend appeals to a reason that does not 
seem to me very cogent: for her, it seems that only things partially made by a natural kind 
may be patchworked items, thus a patchwork partially made by fiction, which definitely is 
no natural kind, would not be such. Cf. (2008:163-4), (2011:166). 
22 Stock (2011) does not allow for this concession as well. For in her mind, although it 
may be the case that a content featuring a fictional work is both imagined and believed, 
in order for the work that includes that content to be fictional, it must contain some other 
content connected to the previous one that is just imagined and not believed. According 
to Friend (2008:160-1), (2011:171-3), however, this idea does not provide sufficient con-
ditions in order for something to be fictional: even nonfictional works may well induce 
one not to believe their whole content but just to imagine it. I also doubt that this is a 
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First of all, as I just said, it may well be the case that one and the same 
text as a whole is uttered both fictionally and nonfictionally. When this is 
the case, two works stem out of the same text. In this respect, Walton’s 
claim (1990:87-90) that something originally designed to be a work of 
one kind may also turn out to be a work of the other kind appears to be 
justified.23
Besides, when a text as a whole is not surrounded by a double perspec-
tive, a fictional and a nonfictional one, it may still be the case that such 
a text amounts as a whole to a work of just one kind and yet some of its 
sentences are uttered not only in the way enabling it to be a work of that 
kind, but also in the other way. Since just a part of those sentences are 
uttered in this second way while those sentences as a whole are uttered in 
the first way, it is normally taken for granted that just one work stems out 
of such sentences.24 Or at least, this is the way we take how things stand 
in a lot of cases. On the one hand, this is the case of historical novels. 
The text constituting one such novel contains some sentences that are 
nonfictionally uttered. Yet those very sentences are also taken together 
with the other sentences of the text, which are uttered merely fictionally, 
in order for a fictional story to be told. As a result, the text is fictionally 
uttered as a whole, thereby amounting just to a fictional work; the fact 
that just some bits of that text are also uttered nonfictionally does not 
normally prompt also a nonfictional work to arise out of it. But on the 
other hand, it is also the case of literary history, new journalism, and even 
scientific treatises. The text constituting any such item contains some 
necessary requirement for a work to be fictional. A way to justify this doubt is to appeal 
to context shifts that may make one and the same amount of content be both actually 
believed qua featuring a nonfictional work and made believe, i.e., believed in a fictional 
context, qua featuring a fictional work. See the next Section.
23 One may object that this way of putting things obliterates the distinction between 
what is a fictional work and what is treated as such (cf. e.g. Currie 1990:36, Lamarque & 
Olsen 1994:48). Yet since this way is neutral between the speechact-theoretical and the 
pretense-theoretical approach and the objection only concerns the latter approach, such 
an objection does not arise here. As how to deal with that objection in the minimally con-
textualist approach that resumes the pretense-theoretical approach, see the next Section.
24 I say normally, for one can figure out cases in which even though, unlike utterance 
of the one kind, utterances of the other kind cover the whole text, not only the latter ut-
terances determine a work of a certain kind, but also the former utterances are taken to 
determine a (mini) work of the other kind. See the next Section.
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sentences that are fictionally uttered, yet those very sentences are also 
taken together with the other sentences of the text, which are uttered 
merely nonfictionally, in order for a nonfictional story to be told. As a 
result, the text is nonfictionally uttered as a whole, thereby amounting 
just to a nonfictional work; the fact that just some bits of that text are 
also uttered fictionally does not normally prompt also a fictional work 
to arise out of it. 
Finally, it may be the case that the same collection of sentences consti-
tuting a text is partially uttered fictionally and partially uttered non-fic-
tionally. Since no way of uttering such sentences prevails, then one and 
the same text prompts again different works, a fictional and a nonfic-
tional one, just as in the first case above. Yet this time the two works 
stem out not of that text as a whole, but of its respective parts.
All in all, therefore, there is no patchworked work arising out of one 
and the same text.
Needless to say, an opponent of the utterance approach will be dis-
satisfied with this way of dealing with the ‘patchwork’ problem. What 
makes it the case, she may wonder, that a whole text, not just some of 
its utterances, is uttered in a way – fictional, nonfictional – that makes 
it amount to (at least) a work of the same kind – fictional, nonfictional? 
Coming back to (1), is this not a mere geographical description of a 
particular area of Lombardy, so that nothing fictional arises out of it? 
Conversely, is not (2) just a bit of fictional invention that is not uttered 
in a nonfictional way? Thus, if the work is of a certain kind – fictional, 
nonfictional – this does not depend on the fact that all its sentences are 
uttered in the same way – fictional, nonfictional – for there is no such 
fact. If this is the case, moreover, why when a text is uttered partially in 
one way partially in another, we have to speak of two works stemming 
out of it rather than of a single patch worked work? As Friend nicely sums 
up the problem, “an approach that sheds no real light on how we move 
from the parts to the whole is inadequate” (2012:186).
In order for a defender of the utterance approach to deal with this 
problem, I have in the next Section to specify better the mechanism that 
makes utterances fictional vs. nonfictional.
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3. The Nature of Fiction
In this Section, first, I want to argue that a minimally contextualist 
account is the best way to develop this utterance approach. Second, I 
want to show how this account may turn out to be helpful in order to 
understand the nature of fiction.
As I said before, the utterance approach may be developed in two 
ways: either by appealing to speech acts or by appealing to context 
shifts. The first way is definitely pragmatic: as most people say, speech 
acts capture a level of significance for sentential utterances that goes 
beyond the semantic level they involve, which is paradigmatically given in 
truth-conditional terms. The second way is basically semantic. Granted, 
it appeals to contexts, from it draws a distinction between fictional and 
nonfictional contexts. Yet such an appeal is minimal, for any such con-
text is just a narrow contexts of interpretation, i.e., a set of a definite 
number of parameters that, given the linguistic meaning of a sentence, 
automatically yield the truth-conditions such a sentence possesses in 
that context. In this respect, a sentence – narrow context pair is just a 
theoretical representation of an utterance.25 
Thus, according to the first way, the difference between a fictional and 
a nonfictional utterance, hence between a fictional and a nonfictional 
work, is pragmatic as well. A sentence that has certain truth-conditions 
may be uttered either in a fictional way so as to perform a certain sui 
generis speech act or in a nonfictional way so as to perform another 
speech act (typically, an assertion). 
Yet according to the second way, the difference between a fictional 
and a nonfictional utterance, hence between a fictional and a nonfictional 
work, is semantic as well. On the one hand, a fictional utterance is an 
utterance of a certain sentence in a certain fictional narrow context that 
contextually yields that sentence certain fictional truth-conditions – the 
sentence is true in a certain fictional world, the world that saturates the 
corresponding parameter of that fictional context, iff things unfold in a 
certain way in that world, the way it says. On the other hand, a nonfic-
tional utterance is an utterance of a certain sentence in a certain nonfic-
25 On this, cf. Predelli (2005). 
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tional narrow context that contextually yields that sentence certain real 
truth-conditions – the sentence is true in the actual world, the world that 
saturates the corresponding parameter of that nonfictional context, iff 
things unfold in that world as it says.26
Take e.g. (1). Uttered in the fictional context of Manzoni’s tale, the sen-
tence is true in the world of that tale iff the relevant branch of a certain 
lake, the Lake of Como, has a certain configuration there. Yet uttered in 
a nonfictional context, (1) is actually true iff the Lake of Como has a cer-
tain configuration in the actual world. Since things so unfold both in the 
world of Manzoni’s tale and in the actual world, (1) is (in its respective 
context) fictionally and actually true respectively. Now take (2). Uttered in 
a nonfictional context, the sentence is actually true iff a certain individual 
named “Arthur” both succeeded another individual named “Uther” and 
besieged a third individual named “Colgrin” in the actual world. As there 
actually is no such individual, the sentence in such a context is false or 
truth-valueless (depending on your favourite semantics of proper names). 
Yet when uttered in a fictional context, the context of Geoffrey’s tale, 
the sentence is fictionally true iff Arthur succeeded Uther and besieged 
Colgrin in the world of that tale. As in the world of that tale there are all 
such unactual individuals, the sentence (in that context) is fictionally true. 
I claim that the second way, the minimally contextual one, is better 
than the first one. There are at least three reasons for me to make such 
a claim. First of all, the notion of a work is basically semantic. The nicest 
theoretical representation of a work indeed consists in taking it as a set 
of hybrid entities, notably entities-cum-meaning, i.e., linguistic structures 
plus their semantic interpretation. This conforms to the second way: for 
26 True enough, one might rather appeal to wide contexts, i.e., the concrete situations 
of discourse, and claim in a maximally contextualist vein that different wide contexts 
provide different truth-conditions – fictional, real – for the sentences involved. Yet an 
economy motto suggests itself that says, don’t appeal to wide contexts if you can appeal 
to narrow contexts. There must be a reason as to why one has to prefer wide to nar-
row context. One such reason might be that ontologically speaking appealing to fictional 
worlds as parameters of narrow contexts is a bad move, since fictional worlds may even 
be impossible ones (I owe this suggestion to Fred Kroon.) Yet if one endorses an Ersatzist 
metaphysics of fictional worlds, the ontological cost of appealing to such worlds may be 
a price worth paying.
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it, a work is set of entities made of utterances (sentences in narrow con-
text) plus their truth-conditional interpretation.27
Moreover, the separation between nonfictional contexts and fictional 
contexts may well explain why one may entertain both a belief and a 
make-belief attitude with respect to the same text. One believes the 
nonfictional content that text expresses in a real context – i.e., the real 
truth-conditions of its sentences in that context – while making believe 
the fictional content that text expresses in the fictional context – i.e., the 
fictional truth-conditions of its sentences in that context –, or, which is 
the same, believing in this context this very content. Now, nothing pre-
vents the nonfictional content and the fictional content expressed by a 
text in their respective contexts from being identical, as is the case with 
the above (1). Pace Gibson (2007:166), there is in general no problem 
in believing and making believe one and the same content.28 Yet this 
compatibility is even more warranted, I hasten to add, if such attitudes 
are related to different contexts, a nonfictional and a fictional one. I may 
well both actually believe and supposedly believe that Hitler is born, if 
this means that in an actual situation I believe what I also believe in a 
possible situation. The same may well happen also when the situations 
in question are an actual and a fictional one. 
27 I slightly modify the account I provided in Voltolini (2006b), where I took what I 
there called fictional works as sets of hybrid entities that result out of the combination of 
sentences plus their truthconditional meaning. To be sure, what I there meant by fictional 
works is different from what I here call fictional works, because the former are constituted 
by fictional entities, abstract entities that figure in the overall domain of what there is, 
while the latter are characteristically constituted by unactual entities, concrete entities 
that do not figure in the overall domain of what there is. To be faithful to this distinction, I 
should label those fictional works as fictional stories and these fictional works as fictional 
tales. Yet for the purposes of this paper let me leave this complication aside.
28 Cf. also Davies (2012:72-3), (2015:41), Friend (2008:156), Stock (2011:149-50). To 
be sure, Gibson specifies that the problem concerns just one and the same appreciative 
state, as he labels it: in that very state one cannot both believe and make-believe the 
same thing (2007:168). If this specification is taken to imply that one can both believe 
and imaginarily believe the same thing yet in different (narrow) contexts, I am fine with it. 
Yet if it is taken to imply that one cannot both believe and imaginarily believe the same 
thing within one and the same mental state, I still disagree with Gibson. For, as we will 
see later, within one and the same metarepresentational state of make-believe one can 
entertain one and the same doxastic representation both as to the actual world and as to 
an unactual, imaginary, world.
U
nauthenticated
D
ow
nload D
ate | 1/27/17 7:54 AM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 17, 2016
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances
42
To this way of putting things, an opponent to the utterance approach 
may still reply that, when a fictional work that is definitely recognized as 
such is at stake, it may be the case that a make-believe attitude just sur-
rounds some of parts of it, yet not the work as a whole. Let’s go back to 
Manzoni’s The Betrothed. Even if it is a fictional work recognized as such, 
it may well be described as being such that some of its parts are just 
believed, not made believe. This is for instance the case with its already 
recalled (1), which is just a true description of some bits of Lombardy. In 
reading (1), people just believe that the Lake of Como has such a config-
uration, yet they do not also make believe that it has that configuration.29 
With respect to this problem, some defenders of the utterance 
approach, notably David Davies (2012, 2015), have bitten the bullet and 
claimed that what holds for fictional narrations does not have to hold 
for fictional works. A fictional narration is that part of a fictional work 
that mobilizes a fictive content, a content that depends on one’s making 
believe that things unfold in a certain way: a de dicto form of make-be-
lieve. Yet a fictional work may also be made of parts that involve a real 
setting. As to such parts, of such a setting, one still makes believe that 
it is in a certain way, a de re form of make-believe. Yet there is no corre-
sponding de dicto make-belief that something is in a certain way. Thus, 
although one may still say that, in a broad sense, the relevant sentences 
of the work concerning such a setting are fictionally true, such sentences 
have no fictive content arising out of a de dicto form of make-believe, so 
that they are not fictionally true in a narrow sense. This is precisely the 
case e.g. with (1): since it concerns the real setting of The Betrothed, it 
is fictionally true just in a broad sense.30
The distinction between those two forms of make-believe is not new. 
It traces back to Evans’ (1982) original idea that there are two kinds of 
make-believe game, creative make believe games in which one makes 
believe that a certain unactual something is so and so and conservative 
29 Cf. Gibson (2007:165-6), Friend (2008:158-61). Mutatis mutandis, says Friend, his-
torical works that are recognized as such may contain parts that are merely made believe, 
not believed.
30 Cf. Davies (2012:78-83), (2015:45-7). Davies labels the theory stemming out of this 
distinction between fictional narrations and fictional works “the refined fictive utterance 
view”. Cf. (2012:80), (2015:45-7).
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make believe games in which of a certain actual something, one makes 
believe that is so and so. This distinction is reprised by Walton (1993) 
when he says that, over and above games of make-believe in which props 
only support a certain make-believe activity, there also are prop-oriented 
games of make-believe that concerns those very props. 
Yet once a defender of the utterance approach appeals to context 
shifts, she may well say that such a distinction does not justify a distinc-
tion between fictional narrations and fictional works. First of all, in the 
parts of a work that trace back to sentences that are affected by a cre-
ative make-believe game, it happens that the fictional truth-conditions 
those sentences have when paired with a fictional context differ from 
the real truth-conditions those sentences have when paired with a non-
fictional context. In Davies’ terms, therefore, that make-believe game 
mobilizes for those sentences a fictive content, i.e., certain fictional 
truth-conditions, different from the real content that is mobilized for 
those sentences out of that game, i.e., certain real truth-conditions. For 
the first truth-conditions involve unactual individuals, while the second 
truth-conditions involve no individual at all. Yet moreover, in the parts of 
a work that trace back to sentences that are affected by a conservative 
make-believe game, there still is a fictional context in which those sen-
tences possess fictional truth-conditions. This is the very same fictional 
context as the one the previous sentences, those affected by a creative 
make-believe game, were paired with, for the ‘world’ parameter is still 
saturated by the same fictional world.31 Yet these fictional truth-condi-
tions are the same as the real truth-conditions such sentences possess 
in a nonfictional context. Hence, that make-believe game still mobilizes 
a fictive content for those sentences, yet that content is the same as the 
real content that is mobilized for them out of that game; indeed, such 
truth-conditions involve the same actual individuals, the individuals of 
what Davies calls a real setting. So, this fictive content just extends 
31 One may object that in order for a narrow content to be the same, it is not enough 
that its world is the same one, for the values of the other parameters of such a context – 
agent, space, time – may change. Yet if the agent of a fictional context is not the real, but 
an ideal narrator as Currie (1990) suggests, then all the other values of the parameters of 
a fictional context may remain the same across the sentences that it affects; not only the 
agent, but also the place and the time from which she supposedly utters those sentences 
may remain the same.
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the fictive content the previous creative make-believe game mobilizes. 
Finally, that conservative make-believe game affects such sentences not 
only when they are fictionally true in that fictional context and actually 
false in a nonfictional context, as Davies maintains, for in that game, one 
makes believe of such actual individuals that they are as they are not in 
the actual world. Rather, it also affects such sentences when they are 
both fictionally true in that very same fictional context and actually true 
in a nonfictional context. Pace Davies, actual truths about a real setting 
are imported as fictional truths, for one makes believe of the actual indi-
viduals of such a setting that they are as they indeed are in the actual 
world. As a consequence, there is no need to draw a distinction between 
a fictional narrative and a fictional work. For the fictional work results out 
of the whole fictional truth-conditions that all the sentences it is based 
on respectively have when paired with a certain fictional context.
Let us go back to The Betrothed once again and consider the sentence 
that introduces one of its main protagonists, Don Abbondio, the fearful 
curate:
(3) Towards evening […], Don Abbondio was returning 
slowly towards his home.
Clearly enough, a creative make-believe game affects (3): one makes 
believe that a certain individual named “Don Abbondio” slowly returns 
home towards evening. Thus, (3) has fictional truth-conditions, once 
it is interpreted in a fictional context whose ‘world’ parameter is satu-
rated by the world of Manzoni’s tale. These truth-conditions depend on 
the reference the name “Don Abbondio” has within such a context, i.e., 
a certain unactual individual. As in the world of that tale this individual 
slowly returns home towards evening, that sentence so interpreted is 
fictionally true. Such truth-conditions clearly differ from those (3) has 
once it is interpreted in a nonfictional context whose ‘world’ parameter 
is saturated by the actual world, where “Don Abbondio” refers to nothing 
at all. Depending on the semantics you appeal to, such a sentence in that 
context turns out to be actually false or truth-valueless. Now consider:
(4) From village to village, from the heights down to the 
margin of the lake, there are innumerable roads and paths 
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[…] One of these pathways [is such that it] branche[s] like 
the letter Y into two narrow paths […] At the confluence […] 
of the two narrow lanes, there were two men.
This time, a conservative make-believe game affects (4): of a certain 
actual pathway along the Lake of Como, one makes believe that at a 
branch of its in two narrow paths, two men were placed, what the tale 
will later reveal to be two dangerous bravoes. Thus, (4) has fictional 
truth-conditions once it is interpreted in a fictional context. Actually, 
this is the same fictional context as the one (3) is paired with, for it is 
again the context whose world is the world of Manzoni’s tale. Yet such 
truth-conditions are the same as the real truth-conditions (4) once it is 
interpreted in a nonfictional context whose world is the actual world. 
Simply, (4) when paired with that fictional context is fictionally true, 
for in the world of Manzoni’s tale that pathway has a branch where two 
bravoes are placed, yet when paired with that nonfictional context it is 
actually false, for in the actual world that pathway has no bravoes at such 
a branch. Finally, let us go back to (1). Pace Davies, (1) may well be inter-
preted in a fictional context, actually the same fictional context as the 
one (3) and (4) are paired with, so that it has fictional truth-conditions as 
well: it is fictionally true iff the Lake of Como has such a configuration in 
the world of Manzoni’s tale. For the previous conservative make-believe 
game affecting (3) also affects (4). Yet not only those truth-conditions 
are the same as the real truth-conditions (1) has when interpreted in a 
nonfictional context – it is true in the actual world iff the lake of Como 
actually has such a configuration – but also (1) is both fictionally and 
actually true: both in the world of Manzoni’s tale and in the actual world, 
the lake has such a configuration. As a result, it is not the case that there 
is a fictive content that just determines a fictional narration, notably a 
part of Manzoni’s The Betrothed, as Davies holds; namely, the fictive con-
tent stemming out of sentences like (3). Rather, not only sentences like 
(3), but also sentences like (4) and (1) are paired with a fictional context, 
actually the very same context, so that they all constitute the fictive con-
tent determining the overall fictional work of The Betrothed.
Furthermore, on the basis of the above reflections, a minimally con-
textualist defender of the utterance approach may address the problems 
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with which I ended the previous Section. Once one performs a seman-
tically relevant context shift, one mobilizes a semantic fictive content 
for all the sentences that are affected by this shift that is at most coin-
cidentally identical with the semantic real content that is mobilized by 
possibly the very same sentences when uttered in a nonfictional con-
text. Thus, such a fictive content may well determine a work of its own 
both when the shift concerns a sentential text as a whole and when it 
concerns just parts of it. Indeed, one may legitimately speak of differ-
ent works, a fictional and a nonfictional one, both in the first and in the 
third case envisaged in the previous Section; namely, both when the 
context shift concerns the text as a whole, thereby making two works 
out of the whole text – the relevant make-believe game, whether cre-
ative or conservative, affects that text as a whole – and when it concerns 
just a part of it, thereby making two works out of different parts of the 
same text – the relevant make-believe game affects just some parts of 
that text. Moreover, in the second of the three cases envisaged in the 
previous Section, namely when a certain context of interpretation affects 
a certain text as a whole and another such context affects it only par-
tially (the case of historical novels on the one hand and new journalism 
on the other), it may well suit our ordinary practices to speak of (fic-
tional, nonfictional) narrations, in Davies’ sense, for the collections of 
(fictional, nonfictional) utterances that cover just a part of a text when 
the opposite kind of utterances covers that text as a whole thereby gen-
erating just a (fictional, nonfictional) work. Recall, however, that our 
speaking in such a case just of one work, the work stemming out of the 
context of interpretation that affects a text as whole, plus one narra-
tion stemming out of the different context of interpretation that affects 
that text merely partially, is a basically pragmatic matter. For such a 
way of speaking depends on the fact that as to meaning generation, 
one context numerically prevails on the other, for it is paired with the 
whole text insofar as, as we have just seen, the whole text is taken as 
telling a certain story (fictional, nonfictional). Yet if we wanted, nothing 
theoretically prevents us from speaking also in such a case not just of 
one work and one narration, but of two works, notably a longer and a 
shorter one. Sometimes, this precisely happens. Consider e.g. Robert 
Musil’s The Man without Qualities, which amounts both to a fictional 
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work – one of the masterpieces of 20th century Western literature (con-
cerning all its sentences qua fictionally uttered) and to a nonfictional 
work, notably a philosophical treatise (concerning just those sentences 
of its text qua nonfictionally uttered). A docufiction can be the opposite 
example (a nonfictional work as a whole, a fictional work just as to the 
parts of its text that also elicit a fictional interpretation).
At this point, however, someone – possibly, a defender of the prag-
matic way of defending the utterance approach – may raise the follow-
ing objection. Appealing to a speech act, even a sui generis one, gives a 
substantive characterization of what a fictional utterance is, no matter 
whether this speech act is cashed out in intentionalist or in normative 
terms. For the fact that an utterance is fictional is explained in terms of 
its being an utterance that performs such an act. Yet qualifying an utter-
ance as fictional in terms of its being interpreted in a fictional context, 
while such a context is further qualified in terms of its having its ‘world’ 
parameter saturated by a fictional world, seems to give no substantive 
information as to what a fictional utterance is, but it simply pushes the 
problem one step back. What is for a world to be fictional?
This objection is well grounded. Speaking of a context shift and appeal-
ing to a fictional context definitely gives a necessary condition in order 
for an utterance to be fictional, but not a sufficient one. Sentences may be 
also uttered e.g. in oneiric contexts, where an oneiric context is a context 
whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by an oneiric world, the world in 
which that sentence in that context is true (or false). Yet their similarity 
notwithstanding,32 a dream and a fiction are not the same thing. So, what 
makes it the case that when a fictional utterance is at stake, the context 
shift in question is the relevant context shift, the shift that makes that 
utterance fictional (rather than oneiric, etc.)?
Borrowing a suggestion that is actually proposed by sustainers of the 
pragmatic way of defending the utterance approach, one might say that 
the context shift is fictional for it is based on a fictive stance, which dif-
fers from the nonfictive stance that surrounds a nonfictional context.33 
32 For an analogous comparison between dreams and fictions cf. Walton (1990:43–50).
33 This idea originally comes from Lamarque & Olsen (1994), who hold that such a 
stance applies to texts in general, even if they agree with Currie (1990) that fictionality 
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Moreover, these different stances may be basically qualified in terms of 
the attitudes one takes with respect to a text. If a text is evaluated as to 
its faithfulness to real facts, that stance is the nonfictive one. Yet if it is 
not so evaluated, that opposite stance is the fictive one.34
Truly enough, whenever there is a semantically relevant context shift, 
there is a further contextual yet pre-semantic reason in order for a sen-
tence to be so shifted.35 Yet when meant in the above terms, a stance 
switch is not sufficient for a shift to be fictional. Like any dream, a day-
dreaming involves a context shift that may well depend on endorsing a 
stance in which no representation in the daydream is evaluated in terms 
of its being faithful to real facts. Yet as we have just seen, a dream, even 
a daydream, is no fiction at all.
In the case of a shift to a fictional context, therefore, we have to look 
for another pre-semantic reason to ground such a shift. Up to now, I have 
implicitly agreed with Walton in holding that such a reason consists in 
the fact that people play a certain make-believe game involving the text 
that is affected by the shift. Yet to my mind, it would be better to say that 
such a reason consists in the fact that the relevant utterer engages her-
self in an act of make-believe concerning the relevant sentences. Indeed 
for me, the best way of conceiving that act is taking it not as a normative 
practice à la Walton (1990), i.e., a practice in which one is prescribed to 
imagine something, but as a mental state à la Currie (1990), provided 
that it is conceived as a mental state of a particular kind: a metarepre-
sentation. Whenever one engages in an act of make-believe, one activates 
i) a (series of) simple representation(s) of the actual world, ii) another 
(series of) simple representation(s) yet of an unactual world – this/these 
is/are the representation(s) whose linguistic expression involves a con-
text shift – and iii) a metarepresentation that the first representation(s) 
and the second representation(s) concern different worlds. When this 
representational triad involves two series of simple representations, as to 
the utterances that express the second series, the series that represents 
lies in the fictive intent with which sentence are uttered.
34 Davies (2007) qualifies those attitudes in terms of the fidelity vs. the nonfidelity 
constraint.
35 For the idea of a pre-semantic role of context see Perry (1997).
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an unactual world, we are legitimated to speak of a fictional narration 
or of a fictional work.
For instance, in the classical example originally provided by Leslie 
(1987), if one makes believe that a certain banana is a telephone, she 
activates a certain simple representation concerning the actual world (the 
representation linguistically expressed by an utterance of the sentence 
“this is a banana”), another simple representation concerning an unac-
tual world (the representation linguistically expressed by a contextually 
shifted utterance of the sentence “this is a telephone”), plus a metarepre-
sentation to the effect that the first representation and the second repre-
sentation concern different worlds. This example corresponds to a case 
of a creative make-believe game, in which a representation of an unac-
tual reality involving an unactual telephone is activated on the basis of a 
different representation of the actual world involving an actual banana, 
which according to Walton (1990) simply plays the role of a prop in that 
game. Truly enough, in the case of a conservative make-believe game, 
we have just one simple representation, for instance in the case of (1) we 
only mobilize a representation involving the actual lake of Como, which 
is not only a prop in the game but also what that game concerns. Yet 
also in such case, that representation is addressed both to an unactual 
world (thereby involving a context shift for its linguistic expression) and 
to the actual world respectively. In that sense, unlike the previous case, 
one and the same representation is both actually believed and imaginarily 
believed. Yet moreover, what makes it a genuine case of make-believe is 
again the fact that over and above such a representation, one also enter-
tains a metarepresentation that in its distinct activations, that very repre-
sentation respectively concerns different worlds. These examples provide 
cases where just a fictional utterance is concerned. To pass from fictional 
utterances to fictional narrations or even to fictional works, one merely 
has to consider cases where the metarepresentational act of make-be-
lieve is extended so as to cover both a series of simple representations 
of the actual world and a series of simple representations of an unactual 
world – possibly, as we have just seen, the very same representations – 
those whose linguistic expressions are contextually shifted.
Certainly enough, no such metarepresentational machinery is involved 
in, say, dreaming. In that case, one only activates a representation of an 
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unactual world; not even a representation of the actual world is in force – 
in virtue of her dreaming, one is representationally disconnected from 
the actual world. For instance, if one dreams of a telephone in front of 
her, only the representation of an unactual world, a telephoneful world, 
of the kind expressed by (a shifted utterance of) “This is a telephone” is 
active; no representation of the actual world arises. This is why dream-
ing is not the same as making believe. 
Yet such a metarepresentational machinery is precisely required in 
order for make-believe to arise. For merely activating two simple repre-
sentations, one for the actual world and another one for the unactual 
world, is not enough in order for one to entertain an act of make-be-
lieve. Consider a dissociated subject, namely someone who has some 
positive understanding of the actual world along with some mental aber-
rations. This subject typically entertains representations of the actual 
world along with representations of an unactual world. For instance, 
someone who is affected by the Capgras syndrome both entertains 
a representation like “This is a relative of mine” of the actual world 
addressed to some actual individual along with a representation like 
“This is an impostor that has replaced my relative” of an unactual world 
yet addressed to the very same individual. Clearly enough, such a sub-
ject is not make-believing. For she fails to entertain a third represen-
tation, i.e., a metarepresentation that the two simple representations 
above concern different worlds. It is precisely because she lacks this 
metarepresentation that she performs a confused form of behavior on 
the basis of the above contrasting simple representations, rather than 
performing a coherent form of behavior that inhibits the causal import 
of the second representation, as any proper make-believer does. For 
instance, one does not panically get out of a cinema while attending 
a scary movie on a green slime, but she rather goes on chewing pop-
corns, for she knows that, unlike the representation “This is a cinema 
screen”, the representation “This is a green slime”36 is addressed to an 
unactual individual.37
36 The example of the green slime notoriously comes from Walton (1978).
37 Thus, so-called’ multiple model’ theories of make-believe, which claim that make-be-
lieve consists in merely activating different representational models, one addressed to the 
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As this example shows, this kind of metarepresentation is not merely 
necessary, but also sufficient, for an utterance of a sentence, hence a 
text, to be fictional. Consider the ordinary case in which a subject under-
goes the illusion, recognized as such, that the stick immersed in the glass 
of water she faces is bent. Clearly enough, uttering “this is bent” while 
recognizing the falsity of what she utters activates in her a metarepre-
sentation that however amounts to no form of make-believe. Simply, by 
means of the above utterance the subject entertains a false representa-
tion of the actual world, which she moreover correctly represents as false. 
Yet when the subject firstly utters “this is not bent” as addressed to the 
actual world, secondly utters “this is bent” as addressed to a nonactual 
world, and finally recognizes that those two representations address 
different worlds, she entertains a metarepresentation that amounts to 
a form of make-believe of the same kind as the one mobilized in the 
‘green slime’ case. Only then, uttering “this is bent” on that subject’s 
part counts as fictional.
This way of putting things has some advantages. First, running 
metarepresentationally may tell make-believe from other forms of imag-
inings. Friend has repeatedly criticized Walton for his appealing, in his 
conception of make-believe, to a notion of imagination that is definitely 
broader than the kind of imagination fiction involves: walt-fiction, as she 
(2008:152) nicely labels it. Not any form of imagination, says Friend, 
determine fiction. “Vividly told nonfiction narratives invite us to imagine 
what it was like for people to live in different times and places, to undergo 
wonderful or horrible experiences, and so on.” (Friend 2012:183).38 One 
may well agree with Friend if one accounts for the narrower kind of imag-
ination that fiction involves in terms of the present metarepresentational 
account of make-believe. Mere imagining, however vividly, a certain sce-
nario is not enough for fiction. In order to make that imagination a fic-
actual world and another addressed to an imaginary world (Perner 1991, Nichols & Stich 
2003), are unable to account for make-believe. As Friend (2008:156) brilliantly intuited. 
The metarepresentational approach to make-believe has been originally defended by Les-
lie (1987). See also Lillard (2002:104): ‘‘a pretender must be aware of the actual situation 
and the nonactual, represented one, or else (s)he is mistaken, not pretending”. For details 
on this, along with my preferred version of metarepresentationalism, cf. Meini-Voltolini 
(2010). 
38 See also Friend (2008:153-4), (2011:164).
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tional kind of imagination, one must not only imagine that scenario, but 
also represent a real scenario and metarepresent that the two represen-
tations concern different scenarios.
Second, running metarepresentationally may successfully deal with 
myths recognized as such in terms of fictional works as any other. Pace 
Currie (1990) and Lamarque & Olsen (1994), this assimilation of myths 
with standard fictional works does not lead to a problematic collapse of 
being a fictional work onto being treated as such. Rather, focusing on 
myths recognized as such paradigmatically shows what is the source for 
a fictional work in general. In myths, one starts from uttering nonfiction-
ally certain sentences, thereby entertaining representations addressed at 
the actual world, e.g. the one expressed by the following utterance of:
(5) Zeus lives on top of Mt. Olympus.
This utterance of (5) is presumably actually false or truthvalueless, 
for in the actual world there is no one named “Zeus” living on top of 
Mt.Olympus. Yet in order for a myth to be recognized as such, one must 
first of all flank the above utterance with another utterance of that very 
sentence, say another utterance of (5) one produces while entertaining 
again that very representation yet addressed to an unactual world. This 
utterance of (5) involves a context shift and is true in the unactual world 
of the relevant context, for in that world there exists a certain individual 
named “Zeus” that lives on the top of Mt.Olympus: the unactual father 
of all gods. Besides, in order for that myth recognition to take place, 
something more must occur, i.e., what makes that utterance of (5) fic-
tional. This is to say, one must entertain another representation, i.e., the 
metarepresentation that the simple representation above concerns the 
actual world at one time and an actual world at another time. An analo-
gous make-believe operation will be performed with the other utterances 
that constitute the myth. Thus in the end, myths are just texts that, 
normally at least, are uttered fictionally not when they are written, but 
afterwards, namely, once they are surrounded by the proper metarepre-
sentational state of make-believe.
Let me take stock. By ultimately accounting for the fictionality of 
an utterance, hence of a work, in terms of the utterer’s entertaining a 
U
nauthenticated
D
ow
nload D
ate | 1/27/17 7:54 AM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 17, 2016
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
Aberto Voltolini
53
metarepresentational act of make-believe, I end up holding that the issue 
of the nature of fiction, or in other terms, the issue of what constitutes 
the fiction/nonfiction divide, cannot be clarified in terms of the fictional/
nonfictional works distinction, hence in terms of the distinction between 
fictional and nonfictional utterances. For things rather go the other way 
around. Granted, what grounds the fictional/nonfictional works distinc-
tion is the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances. Yet 
what makes an utterance fictional is what explains the fiction/nonfiction 
divide, namely the fact that its utterer entertains a metarepresentational 
act of make-believe in which not only she represents both the actual 
world and a fictional world, but also she metarepresents that the second 
representation is a representation of a world different from the world 
the first representation represents. Consider this metarepresentational 
awareness as the little voice whispering to you: “it’s only make-believe”, 
as the famous song says.39
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